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Some economists believe that the work of neuroeconomists threatens the theory of economics. 
Glenn Harrison’s paper “Neuroeconomics: A Critical Reconsideration” attempts to set the score, 
though the points he makes are hidden behind the fumes of his anger (Glenn W. Harrison 2008). 
The field of neuroeconomics is barely into its teenage years; and it is trying to do what? 
Redesign the field of economics developed over a hundred years? No, that is not what 
neuroeconomics is trying to do, in spite of all the efforts of some economists trying to place it 
into that shoebox. Neuroeconomics is a Mendelian-Economics of sort; it is a science that is able 
to generate data by fixing the environment to some degree and looking to see each individual’s 
choices from the initiation of the decision-making process to its outcome. Standard economics 
(SE), on the other hand, looks at the average of the outputs of many individuals and proposes 
how the human chose those outcomes. The two fields, neuroeconomics and SE, are evaluating 
two sides of the same coin; one with and the other without ceteris paribus; they are not 
necessarily in conflict with one another. 
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1. Introduction 
Some economists believe that the work of neuroeconomists threatens standard economics. By 
“standard economics” I mean the type of economics that has been taught in universities as 
“economic theory” since Adam Smith provided its basic tenets; hereafter I call “standard 
economics” simply SE. SE is based on the foundation of many great thinkers, including von 
Neumann and Morgenstern, who established the four axioms of the expected utility theory that is 
so much questioned these days. SE is based on many assumptions of human behavior that were 
derived from observing the outcome of human decision-making. Such outcome is available to all 
economists from government databases and they portray what the population has consumed in 
the previous months and years.  
 
Contrary to popular belief in many economic circles, neuroeconomics is neither psychology nor 
the study of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Neuroeconomics is the scientific 
process of economics by which researchers from many disciplines cooperate and share methods 
in order to generate various scientific experiments that specifically prompt certain human or 
animal decision-making processes in order to evaluate the outcome in a controlled environment. 
Neuroeconomics contains methods that were developed by psychologists, neurologists, 
anthropologists, biologists, geneticists, mathematicians, physicists, and many other fields, 
including experimental and behavioral economists.   
2. The War: Ceteris Paribus 
Some of the statements found in the literature Harrison refers to undoubtedly give reason to his 
conclusions but those statements he critiques are not representative of the work of 
neuroeconomists; they provide only explanations of some of their methods. One may critique the 
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theory of the expected utility in the same way by which its axioms are so rigidly drawn—and 
many researchers (neuroeconomists, behavioral economists, and experimental economists) are 
doing just that. It seems that the tug of war is not over the merits of the two fields but its 
examples and explanations about the outcomes. Neuroeconomics does not question the 
fundamental concepts of SE without merit, since those concepts are derived from the outcome of 
decision-choices rather than the process itself. There is nothing wrong with looking at outcomes 
and formulating a theory as to the “why,” so long as the answer to the “why” can, in fact, be 
placed into a forecast to yield the same results over and over again, as in “real” science. 
 
The conventional thinking in SE is that a person’s preferences will not change ceteris paribus 
when presented with two identical bundles at two separate times and if the goods in these 
bundles come with the same probability. Suppose this is true; an individual is presented with a 
set of bundles A and B and a few minutes later she is presented with the same set of bundles A 
and B in the exact same way and in the same combination as before, ceteris paribus. According 
to economics, if she chose bundle A before, since it is ceteris paribus, she will choose bundle A 
again, if she is consistent.   
 
The problem in this example is not with the bundles or whether she prefers bundle A as state or 
not state preference; the problem is the ceteris paribus. There is no such that “at another time” if 
the ceteris paribus was evoked. By definition time has passed between the two choices. While 
mathematically such time differential can indeed be fixed to a ceteris paribus statement and 
consistency may be expected under that condition, in real life time means that several heart beats 
have passed, the person took at least one breath, and the person’s entire internal chemistry has 
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changed. There is no such as ceteris paribus when it comes to real life. By definition we cannot 
have a valid economic theory that sets its most fundamental theories on ceteris paribus.  
 
It is important to deliberate on these chemical changes because the essence of human 
consumption is based on the chemical state of the human brain at the moment the choice is being 
made. It is not possible to look at the outcome of these decisions and pretend that a ceteris 
paribus will provide enough stability for the same individual to make the same decision twice in 
moments passing in the same decision-choice task. Economists ask why we care to understand 
the human decision-making machine if we have the output to look at?  
 
The purpose of economics is not to have beautiful and simple mathematical models but to have 
models that are useful for formulating business and policy decisions. Economics must be able to 
explain the outcome as well as understand the means by which those outcomes were achieved in 
order to help repeat the positive outcomes in the future. Forecasting what will happen based on 
what happened in the past is neither enough nor interesting; forecasting how to create the desired 
outcome is far more important and much more exciting. And this “how to” must encompass real 
humans so long as we talk about the economic activities of real humans.  
 
Economics assumes that decision-making is based on a calculated effort at all times (Andrew 
Mas-Colell et al. 1995;Oliver E. Williamson 1993;John Quiggin 1993), which we now know is 
not the case. Let me quote, as Harrison did, Camerer, Loewstein and Prelec (2004, 2005) 
“…there is considerable evidence from neuroscience and other areas of psychology that the 
motivation to take an action is not always closely tied to hedonic consequences” (Colin Camerer 
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et al. 2004;Colin Camerer et al. 2005). Harrison responds by “…this is not what economics 
assumes at all. We say that choices reveal preferences, on a good inferential day…” (Glenn W. 
Harrison 2008) (page 8). So “choices reveal preferences” and “on a good inferential day.”  
 
It is raining where I am today—is this a good inferential day? Yesterday the sun was out for 
about an hour and I was out walking my dog and shooting pictures of the new flowers that 
pocked their heads out for the first time; was this a good inferential day? More importantly, are 
the two days equal in terms of what decision I will make and how these decisions will reveal my 
preferences? If on the rainy day one chooses bundle A and on the sunny bundle B, will that 
inform economics in any way? Note that ceteris paribus fixes rain or sun but the decision cannot 
be fixed in a ceteris paribus environment any more than the person who makes those decisions 
can. 
 
If we assume these two different choices reveal preferences correctly, since those were two 
independent moments of the day and on average once choice A and once choice B is preferred, 
what is the policy-maker to conclude using the theory of consumer choice under uncertainty? 
What we see in these choices appear to be inconsistent preferences by this person and when we 
look at the population en-large and we look at the choice outcome for the week of all individuals 
in the US, we may conclude that the economy is in a particular state because individuals 
purchase this way and that—and on average it provides a particular result. Yet in reality, the 
choices did not reflect anything we can tie to the health and wealth of the society; the choices 
reflected the mood of the millions of individuals, which appeared to balance out—some chose 
bundle A and others bundle B as a result of the weather in the particular environment.  
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Thus when it comes to making a decision by a firm whether to manufacture more of products in 
the bundle A or those in the bundle B, economic theory should be able to tell the firm to produce 
A if good weather is likely and produce B in larger numbers when it is going to be raining. 
Current economic theories are not able to do that because they are not interested in the methods 
by which real humans make decisions and the weather is fixed under ceteris paribus. Harrison 
suggests that when a subject perceives something differently from other times, then “one can 
argue that it is a different task” (ibid, page 9). Thus Harrison would conclude that the choice 
between bundles A and B on a rainy day represents a different task from choosing among the 
same bundles on a sunny day.  I beg to differ on this point; it is not the bundles that changed, it is 
not the task that changed, nor did the value of the bundles change. What changed is the ceteris 
paribus.  
3. What’s Your Hormone Got to Do with It? 
It is hard to accept that people make decisions in a laboratory setting similarly to how they would 
make those same decisions in the real world. Harrison points out that the representation of a task 
in an artificial lab environment is different from a real one. Yet research shows that the 
representation of something fake is very real in the mind of an individual. Numerous studies 
show that both in humans and in monkeys, images or sounds of the real thing trigger the 
activation of the brain similarly to when the individual is actually engaged in doing that thing.  
Image of a hand (even if clearly a rubber hand) activates the exact same region of the brain as if 
the participant’s hand itself was really pocked (Philip L. Jackson et al. 2006;Philip L. Jackson et 
al. 2005;India Morrison et al. 2004;Philip L. Jackson et al. 2005;H. Henrik Ehrsson et al. 2007). 
Hand to mouth actions in monkeys activate the exact same brain areas as when they simply listen 
to sounds that are associated with similar actions (Valeria Gazzola et al. 2006).   
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Experiments of the kind used in the laboratory have been taken out to real societies and the 
results show that not only do people behave similarly in lab environment and real life 
experiments, but that there is a cultural influence over how an economic choice is made (Joseph 
Patrick Henrich 2004;Joseph Patrick Henrich et al. 2005;Joseph Patrick Henrich et al. 2001). 
The most important aspect of these findings is that “rationality” is dependent on the culture of 
the beholder.   
 
If economic theory holds, there is only one way to solve a particular problem. The meaning of 
“rational” has changed over the years but it remains controversial whether it is a term that should 
be used at all. At one point “rational” meant to be a Homo economicus in every respect, implying 
self-maximizing choices in a consistent fashion. Today we find that humans maximize elements 
in decision-making that are not visible if we only look at outputs—hence looking only at outputs 
provides faulty image of incentives and preferences. 
 
The point of highest importance in decision-outcomes is the hormones of the human brain that 
fluctuate in the body in response to environmental stimuli. The same exact task will have a 
different outcome if a particular hormone is in high or low levels in the body—and yes, these 
hormones change naturally given external environmental and internal changes in the human body 
that are beyond observational possibilities. For example, a person will make choices differently 
based on whether he had traffic or could fly on the freeway on his way to work, if his team won 
or lost the game, or if he had sex recently or not. Women will have completely different 
chemical structures every minute, as part of their menstrual cycle they are in changes 
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continually. Given any choice task will lead to different economic outcomes given her monthly 
cycle, his luck on the freeways or his teams with their games (Paul J. Zak et al. 2005a).  
 
Most recent neuroeconomics research using hormonal studies show that the human reward 
system in the brain prefers to maximize its utility in the currency of dopamine rather than money 
or more apples and less oranges. It is also clear that eating apples and oranges translate into 
pleasure in the brain, which activates the reward center, evoking an economic system that is 
completely invisible to economists looking at outputs. It was a great surprise, and at first often 
under attack, when it was found (in labs and in life experiments) that humans are willing to 
punish at a cost to themselves. Why would a rational human chose less money over more money, 
ceteris paribus? Attacks came from all sides, saying that people must not understand the game, 
they want to please the researchers, the amount of money at stake is too small, or that they play 
differently in labs from real life. But then new experiments captured the utility of punishing: 
hormonal reward in the brain (Tania Singer et al. 2006;James H. Fowler 2005;D. J-F. 
DeQuervain et al. 2004).  
 
Hormonal research shows that indeed, many economic decision-making can be stimulated one 
way or another by the natural variations of hormonal levels (Paul J. Zak et al. 2005b;Paul J. Zak 
et al. 2004), or the use of administered hormones that are set to stimulate a particular part of the 
brain. For example, landmark studies showed that the hormone Oxytocin makes people more 
trusting (Michael Kosfeld et al. 2005) and more generous (Paul J. Zak et al. 2007;Angela A 
Stanton 2007). Oxytocin is manufactured in the human brain in various amounts throughout the 
day. Environmental stimuli as simple as a salesman tapping a shopper’s shoulder to say “how are 
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you?” in a used car dealership may make the shopper release more Oxytocin, which then makes 
him more trusting toward the sales rep. Hormonal variations in the brain are not there to trick 
economists; they have been there throughout human evolution, each with specific roles. 
Oxytocin, for example, has the role to support communication with strangers as well as to create 
bond between mother and child at the moment of birth—among many more functions.   
 
Some other hormones of importance are better known from the news or from individual 
experiences even by laymen. The rush of adrenaline in dangerous situations is well known to 
assist the person to get out of danger. The same hormone may help the market trader make quick 
decisions in a quick-action market day, be it bull or bear day. We can find parallel to this and 
other activities in non-human primates, showing us the evolutionary necessary connection of our 
hormones to our development and to everyday decision-making.  
 
If a researcher can change the decision-making outcome of a person by the administration of 
hormones that all people otherwise already have (in other words hormones are not drugs), can we 
say that decision-making can be modeled without the understanding of the chemical structure of 
the brain?  
4. Molecular Rationality 
Yet interestingly, some of the debate over the separation of SE and neuroeconomics is possibly 
futile because neuroeconomics shows that indeed humans appear to be consistent and the tenets 
of the expected utility theory’s four axioms may well stand the times. In experiments with games 
with hormonal stimuli, studies find that humans are stimulated similarly and the outcome of their 
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decision-making follows the predictions—sometimes linearly. Some clever animal experiments 
show why.  
 
We know that the Orbitofrontal cortex (over the eyes under the orbit of the eyebrows) has 
neurons that encode actual utility values. Monkeys, for example, with single-neuron experiments 
in the Orbitofrontal cortex make their decision-choice based on certain numbers of drops of 
juices they receive. Amazingly, experiments like these lead to the setting up of each monkey’s 
specific utility function based on the clearly identifiable indifference curves it possesses for the 
juices (Camillo Padoa-Schioppa 2007). A most fascinating study with monkeys showed that they 
have personal and social values similarly to humans. Images were shown to monkeys and they 
could choose to look at them for some quantity of juice (the price), some of which they were 
willing to pay to see, while for other images they were willing to pay to go away. In particular, 
male monkeys were found to want to pay with juice currency to see the photographed faces of 
dominant males and the amount they paid for this was more than what they were willing to pay 
to see the faces of females, while they demanded even higher juice-pay to look at photographed 
faces of less dominant males than they perceived themselves to be (Robert O. Deaner et al. 
2005).  
 
Since it is possible to decipher the exact utility function of an individual given the measure of the 
currency exchange for goods and services, also through the examination of a single brain cell, 
and since the particular brain cell remains consistent so long as it is not tricked my varying 
probability of juice payments (M. L. Platt, P. W. Glimcher 1999), it is possible to address 
whether economic theory is capable to provide a particular decision-outcome. If, for example, we 
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find that the brain sometimes chooses apples and other times oranges in a ceteris paribus 
environment with single-neuron experimenting, then we know that an economic theory requiring 
consistency will not be the correct one. On the other hand, if cells choose consistently under 
ceteris paribus conditions in a single-neuron experiment, we then know that neuroeconomics has 
provided support rather than critique of economic theory. 
 
As this research is not yet complete even with monkeys, and it has not actually yet begun with 
humans because of the obvious logistical nightmare of single-cell experimenting, all we can say 
for now is that molecularly speaking, every single human is made of the same chemical elements 
and bonds. It is not going to take hundreds of years for neuroeconomics to find a model that will 
fulfill the need of economists but give this nascent science some room to grow. It is a wonder 
what it can show; why not look and listen or even participate? 
5. Conclusion 
Economics stands only to gain from the tools of neuroeconomics. Of course, similarly to the 
standard supply and demand model taught in every introductory economics class, the benefits 
accrue to the average and not to each individual. It is possible that some economic theories will 
be proven wrong and those who coined them will feel hurt and bruised. On the flip side, there 
will be many whose theories will be proven to stand taller than ever.    
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